[1990 JLR 110] JERSEY CHESHIRE HOME FOUNDATION V. ROTHWELL and OTHERS (practising as ROTHWELL AND PARTNERS), RICHARDS and PETER CAMERON LIMITED ROYAL COURT (Le Marquand, Judicial Greffier): June 4th, 1990 Civil Procedure—pleading—extension of time—third party may have leave to file answer out of time if judgment not obtained against him by convening defendant—no judgment arising by implication under Royal Court Rules, 1982, r.6/10(4)(a) A third party applied for an extension of the 28-day time limit in which to file an answer. In January 1990 the court made an order which, inter alia, joined the first, second and third defendants to an action as third parties and stipulated that they should have 28 days in which to file an answer. One of the third parties, having filed his answer out of time, brought the present proceedings seeking an extension of time. He submitted that since (a) the second defendant, by whom he was convened, had not applied for a default judgment against him; and (b) no judgment could be obtained in Jersey by implication and without a specific order, it followed that r.6/10(4)(a) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, did not give rise to an implied judgment against him and that no judgment existed to prevent the court from allowing the application to extend the time limit, it being open to the second defendant subsequently to apply for judgment against him on admissions under r.6/17(4). The second defendant submitted in reply that (a) the third party had filed his answer out of time; (b) it was impossible for him to obtain judgment against the third party in such circumstances under r.6/7(5) or 6/17(4) of the Rules; and (c) in any case, a default judgment had arisen by implication against that party under r.6/10(4)(a), which was analogous to an “unless order” whereby the defendant would have a
1990 JLR 111 judgment against the third party unless an answer were filed within the time specified, and it followed that the application should be dismissed.
Held, allowing the application: (1) Rule 6/10(4)(a) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, which specified that a third party, not having filed his answer within the given time limit, “shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the defendant’s answer and shall be bound by any judgment . . . or decision in the action . . .” did not give rise to an implied judgment in favour of the second defendant since there was no method of obtaining a judgment by implication and without a specific order made by the court and, moreover, the terms of r.6/10(4)(b) made it clear that the defendant was required to apply for judgment against the third party (page 114, lines 15–38). (2) Since the defendant had not yet applied for a judgment against the third party, there was no judgment in existence against him and, it being common practice for the court to accept the filing of answers out of time, it followed that there was no justification for refusing the application. The defendant could, however, apply under r.6/17(4) or r.6/7(5) of the Rules, or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, for an indemnity order against the third party in relation to such sums as might be found due by the defendant to the plaintiff and in relation to his legal costs (page 115, lines 5–16; page 115, line 41 – page 116, line 3; page 116, lines 31–41). Cases cited: (1) Farley (Ernest) & Son Ltd. v. Takilla Ltd., 1984 J.J. 123, considered. (2) Jones Lang Wootton v. States, Royal Ct., February 3rd, 1989, unreported. Legislation construed: Royal Court Rules, 1982 (R. & O. 7026), r.6/7(5): “Where the time limited for filing an answer has expired and no answer has been filed, the plaintiff may, after giving not less than twenty-four hours’ notice to the Greffier and to the defendant, ask the Court to pronounce judgment against the defendant.” r.6/10(3): The relevant terms of this sub-rule are set out at page 116, lines 10–13. r.6/10(4): The relevant terms of this sub-rule are set out at page 112, lines 28–42. r.6/10(5): “The Court may at any time set aside or vary a judgment given under paragraph (4) above on such terms as it thinks just.” r.6/17(4): “Where admissions of fact are made by a party to an action either by his pleadings or otherwise, any other party to the action may apply to the Court for such judgment or order as on those admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, and the Court may give such judgment or make such order, on the application as it thinks just.”
1990 JLR 112 Text cited: Supreme Court Practice 1988, vol. 1, para. 16/5/2, at 245; para. 16/5/3, at 245. R.J. Michel for the first defendant; J.G. White for the second defendant; R.G.S. Fielding for the third third party. LE MARQUAND, JUDICIAL GREFFIER: On January 23rd, 1990, the Deputy Judicial Greffier made an order, inter alia, joining the first, second and third defendants to this action as second, third and fourth 10 third parties. Paragraph (6) of that order read as follows—“that the second, third and fourth third parties have twenty-eight days from the date hereof to file an answer. . .” Peter Cameron Ltd., the third third party, failed to file a third party answer until March 8th, 1990, which was outside the 28-day period. The present summons has been issued in 15 order to seek an extension of the 28-day period. The main issue before me is the question as to the effect of the failure to file a third party answer within the time allowed. Advocate White, on behalf of the second defendant, submitted that this failure has given his client a judgment against the third third party for reasons set out more 20 fully below. The subsidiary issue has arisen as to how, if Advocate White’s argument is wrong, a defendant may obtain a judgment against a third party who defaults in filing a pleading. That issue is merely a matter which has arisen in argument in passing and my opinion on that matter is therefore obiter dicta but nevertheless I will express an opinion 25 on that matter as it may well assist members of the legal profession in future cases. Rule 6/10(4) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, as amended, states: “Where the time limited for filing an answer by the third party has expired and no answer has been filed— 30 (a) he shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the defendant’s answer and shall be bound by any judgment (including judgment by consent) or decision in the action insofar as it is relevant to any claim, question or issue stated in the defendant’s answer; and 35 (b) the defendant by whom the third party was convened, may, if judgment by default is given against him in the action, at any time after satisfaction of that judgment and, with the leave of the Court, before satisfaction thereof, obtain judgment against the third party in respect of any 40 contribution or indemnity claimed in his answer and, with the leave of the Court, in respect of any other relief or remedy claimed therein.” The wording of r.6/10(4) is very similar to that of O.16, r.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965. In fact, the only differences are those 45 which are consequential upon differences in our procedure.
Advocate White’s argument may be summarized as follows: (a) that r.6/10(4)(a) states that a third party in the position of the third third party in this action shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the defendant’s answer; 5 (b) that although r.6/10(4) was very similar to O.16, r.5, the Jersey procedure was materially different from the English procedure; (c) that in England in such circumstances a third party could apply ex parte for a default judgment; (d) that the intention behind r.6/10(4) in the absence of a similar ex 10 parte procedure was not to make it more difficult for such a default judgment to be obtained and therefore must be to give the defendant a judgment; and (e) that the appropriate procedure was for the third party to apply under r.6/10(5) for the judgment to be set aside. 15 In passing, Advocate White alleged that neither r.6/7(5) nor r.6/17(4) allowed a defendant to take a judgment against a third party in such circumstances and that therefore a judgment must be implied so that the words “shall be deemed to admit any claims stated in the defendant’s answer and shall be bound” were equivalent to the words “shall be 20 deemed to have a judgment given against him.” Advocate White further stated that although he was not able to quote as a precedent any other example of a judgment being presumed, the position was analogous to that of an “unless order.” That is to say, that the effect of r.6/10(4) was that of an “unless order” stating that unless the third party filed an 25 answer within the time period, the defendant would have a judgment against him. Advocate Fielding for the third third party argued that no judgment had been obtained, that there was no other example in Jersey law in which a judgment could be given by implication of law without the need 30 for an actual verdict to be pronounced by a court and that it was open to a defendant to apply under r.6/17(4) for judgment on admissions. Advocate Fielding took the view that it would not be appropriate for a defendant to apply under r.6/7(5). Advocate Michel for the first defendant agreed that there was no 35 judgment in existence and argued that under the English procedure it was still necessary for a judgment to be pronounced. He took the view that a defendant could apply either under r.6/17(4) or under r.6/7(5). Advocate Fielding referred to 1 The Supreme Court Practice 1988, para. 16/5/2, at 245, and I now quote that paragraph in full: 40 “Effect of default by third party—Where the third party is in default of giving notice of intention to defend or, when ordered to serve a defence, in default of defence, he is deemed to admit the claim stated in the third party notice and is bound by any judgment or decision in the action in so far as it is relevant to any claim, 45 question or issue stated in the notice. Whether the effect of such
1990 JLR 114 admission and of being so bound entitles the defendant to apply for judgment, O.27, r.3 has not been decided; but, especially when the third party is in default of defence, there seems no reason why that rule should not apply to such a case.” 5 Order 27, r.3 is the English rule on judgment on admissions and corresponds very closely to our r.6/17(4). Advocate Fielding also referred to para. 16/5/3 and the fact that it states “there appear to be two modes by which the defendant may enter judgment against a third party in default.” Those two modes are in fact those which are set out in O.16, 10 r.5(1)(a) and (b) and are in circumstances which are analogous to those set out in r.6/10(4)(a) and (b). Advocate Fielding’s argument was that in each case a judgment had to be entered and that under O.16, r.5(1)(a) this had to be with leave unless the defendant had already satisfied any judgment given against him by the plaintiff. 15 I do not find any part of Advocate White’s argument attractive. It is clear to me that even in England a judgment is not presumed but that some procedure has to be followed in order to obtain it. It is clear, as a matter of general principle, that it is more difficult to obtain a judgment in Jersey than it is in England and that a judgment can only be obtained 20 in Jersey by a specific order of a court. An “unless order” is in itself a specific order of a court. I therefore find it impossible to agree with him that r.6/10(4)(a) gives rise to an implied judgment. Indeed, I do not believe that any rule of court or principle of law in the Island of Jersey gives rise to a judgment without the decision of a court. However, there 25 is a fundamental flaw in Advocate White’s argument by reason of the terms of r.6/10(4)(b). This sub-rule deals with a particular example of default under r.6/10(4), namely that in which the defendant allows a default judgment to be taken against him. In those circumstances it is clear that the defendant still has to apply under r.6/10(4)(b) in order to 30 obtain a judgment against the third party. That clearly presumes that he does not already have a judgment against the third party but on Advocate White’s argument he would already have such a judgment under r.6/10(4)(a). Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I reject the second 35 defendant’s arguments and find that the second defendant has no judgment against the third third party. Similarly, the first defendants have no judgment against the third third party, although the first defendants have never argued along those lines. Counsel for both the first defendants and the second defendant having 40 accepted that if I found that there was no judgment in existence then there remained no satisfactory arguments against extending the time period, I have so ordered. All three counsel were aware of the fact that it is often the practice of advocates to file pleadings outside the strict time periods and that no objection is usually raised to them. An obvious 45 example of this would be the filing of an answer. Answers are often filed
1990 JLR 115 out of time and the court will normally only grant a judgment under r.6/7(5) when the default has continued up to the time on the Friday afternoon at which the application under that rule is heard. It has not been the practice of the Judicial Greffe to refuse to accept pleadings 5 which are filed out of time. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in the case of Ernest Farley & Son Ltd. v. Takilla Ltd. (1), which related to the appeal procedure in the Court of Appeal, indicated that the Judicial Greffe should not reject a document for some procedural irregularity but that the document should be filed and then subsequently attacked by the 10 other party. The same principle would appear to apply to Royal Court pleadings, although it is unusual for another party to oppose a document which has been filed out of time. Other parties have effective remedies to force the filing of an answer or a third party answer or further and better particulars of an existing pleading and the court has effective 15 powers under r.6/21(2) to give directions in relation to the filing of further pleadings on an application for setting down on the hearing list. I turn finally to the question as to whether a defendant can obtain a judgment against a third party prior to judgment being given against the defendant in the main action. It is clear that the procedures referred to 20 in sub-paras. (a) and (b) of r.6/10(4) only come into effect upon judgment being given in the main action. 1 The Supreme Court Practice 1988, para. 16/5/3, at 245 explains the way in which a defendant obtains a judgment against a third party after judgment in the main action. In my view, in Jersey it will be necessary for a defendant to apply for such a 25 judgment and this could most conveniently be done at the hearing of the trial under sub-para. (a) or on the giving of the default judgment under sub-para. (b). However, there remains a very real practical problem from the point of view of a defendant. If the defendant has to wait until the actual trial 30 of the action or until some interim judgment is given against him and if the third party is in a position to be able to file a third party answer at any time subject to its being opposed as mentioned above, then the defendant has difficulty in knowing whether or not he can safely assume that the third party is admitting liability to the defendant as set out in the 35 third party claim. There should, therefore, be some method by which the defendant can obtain a judgment from the court against the third party to the effect that the third party is bound to indemnify the defendant in relation to such sums as may be found due by the defendant to the plaintiff and in relation to the costs of the action 40 incurred by the defendant. Advocate White argued that r.6/17(4) was not applicable because the deemed admissions under r.6/10(4)(a) were not admissions of fact. I do not agree with this argument as I cannot see that the deemed admissions of any claim stated in the defendant’s answer can be anything other than 45 admissions of fact as well as admissions of law. Accordingly, I agree
1990 JLR 116 with the commentator in para. 16/5/2 quoted above that there seems no reason why O.27, r.3 in England and r.6/17(4) in Jersey should not apply to such a case. I come finally to the question as to whether r.6/7(5) also applies. 5 Advocate Michel argued that it applied and that the defendant therefore had two ways of proceeding. He said that an application under r.6/17(4) would be preferable, as a judgment on admissions was a better judgment than a judgment in default of an answer. The matter turns upon the interpretation of r.6/10(3) which states: 10 “Where a third party has been so convened, he shall from the time of service be a party to the action as if he had been made a defendant in an original action either by the defendant on whose application he was convened or by the plaintiff.” The question is whether or not this sub-rule brings the third party within 15 the terms of r.6/7(5). I am not able to obtain any assistance from The Supreme Court Practice 1988, as neither r.6/10(3) nor r.6/7(5) have parallels therein. It is clear that r.6/10(3) has an effect in relation to the question of prescription periods and this was demonstrated in Jones Lang Wootton v. States (2). However, does r.6/10(3) mean that for all 20 purposes a third party shall be treated as if he were a defendant? This is an important point as a number of rules, including r.6/9 relating to counterclaims, r.6/15 in relation to interrogatories and r.6/26(1) in relation to payment into court, refer to defendants but not to third parties. It would appear to be logical in relation to those rules that third 25 parties ought to have the same rights and privileges as against defendants as defendants have against plaintiffs. The question in relation to r.6/7(5) is whether defendants ought to have the same rights as against third parties as plaintiffs have against defendants. There is a difficulty inasmuch as r.6/7(5) refers specifically to the plaintiff’s having 30 the right to apply, whereas r.6/17(4) refers to admissions of fact by a party to an action in an application by any other party to the action. I am of the opinion that a defendant must have a satisfactory means of obtaining judgment against a third party who is in default of an answer and that the combination of r.6/10(3) and r.6/7(5) would appear to 35 provide a second method to that provided by r.6/17(4). However, if that view is wrong, then it appears to me that a defendant has the right to bring to the court’s attention the failure of the third party to comply with the rules and to seek an appropriate order to compel performance therewith. If that is not strictly under the terms of r.6/7(5), then it 40 appears to me that such an order could be obtained by summons before the Royal Court under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Leonard CheshireFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Group Captain Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, Baron Cheshire, VC, OM, DSO and Two Bars, DFC (7 September 1917 – 31 July 1992) was a highly decorated British RAF pilot during the Second World War.
Among the honours he received as a bomber pilot is the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces. After the war, he became a charity worker, setting up the Leonard Cheshire Disability as well as other philanthropic organisations.
Leonard Cheshire was the son of Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire, DCL, LLD, FBA, a barrister, academic and influential writer on English law. He had one brother, Christopher Cheshire, also a wartime pilot. Cheshire was born in Chester, but was brought up at his parents' home near Oxford. He was educated at the Dragon School, Oxford, Stowe School and Merton College, Oxford. While at Oxford he became friends with John Niel Randle. On one occasion at Oxford he was bet half a pint of beer that he could not walk to Paris. With no more than a few pennies and a pocket handkerchief he won his bet. Cheshire graduated in Jurisprudence in 1939. He went to stay in Germany in 1936 with a family in Potsdam
After the outbreak of the Second World War, Cheshire applied for a commission in the Royal Air Force and was initially posted in June 1940 to 102 Squadron, flying Armstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bombers, from RAF Driffield. In November 1940, he was awarded the DSO for flying his badly-damaged bomber back to base.
In January 1941, he completed his tour of operations, but then volunteered straight away for a second tour. He was posted to 35 Squadron with the brand new Handley Page Halifax, and completed his second tour early in 1942, by now a Squadron Leader. August 1942 saw a return to operations as CO of No. 76 Squadron RAF. The squadron had recently suffered high losses operating the Halifax, and Cheshire immediately tackled the low morale of the unit by ordering an improvement in the performance of the squadron aircraft by removing the mid-upper and nose gun turrets along with exhaust covers and other weighty non-essential equipment. This allowed the bombers to fly higher and faster. Losses soon fell and morale rose accordingly.
In 1943 Cheshire published an account of his first tour of operations in his book "Bomber Pilot" which tells of his posting to RAF Driffield and tells the story of flying his badly-damaged bomber ("N for Nuts") back to base. In the book he fails to mention being awarded the DSO for this, but does describe the bravery of a badly burnt member of his crew.
Cheshire became Station Officer Commanding RAF Marston Moor in March as the youngest Group Captain in the RAF, though the job was never to his liking and he pushed for a return to an operational command. These efforts paid off with a posting as commander of the legendary 617 "Dambusters" Squadron in September 1943.
While with 617, Cheshire helped pioneer a new method of marking enemy targets for Bomber Command's 5 Group, flying in at a very low level in the face of strong defences, using first, the versatile Mosquito, then a "borrowed" P-51 Mustang fighter. This development work was the subject of some severe intraservice politics; Cheshire was encouraged by his 5 Group Commander Air Vice-Marshal Ralph Cochrane, although the 8 Group Pathfinder AOC Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett saw this work as impinging on the responsibilities of his own command.
Cheshire was nearing the end of his fourth tour of duty in July 1944, having completed a total of 102 missions, when he was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was the only one of the 32 VC airmen to win the medal for an extended period of sustained courage and outstanding effort, rather than a single act of valour. His citation noted:
In four years of fighting against the bitterest opposition he maintained a standard of outstanding personal achievement, his successful operations being the result of careful planning, brilliant execution and supreme contempt for danger – for example, on one occasion he flew his P-51 Mustang in slow 'figures of eight' above a target obscured by low cloud, to act as a bomb-aiming mark for his squadron. Cheshire displayed the courage and determination of an exceptional leader.[1]
It also noted a raid in which he had marked a target, flying a Mosquito at low level against "withering fire".
One of Cheshire's missions was to use new 5,400 kilograms (12,000 lb) "Tallboy" deep-penetration bombs to destroy V3 long-range cannons located in underground bunkers near Mimoyecques in the Pas-de-Calais region of northern France. These were powerful guns able to fire a 500 lb shell into London every minute. They were protected by a concrete layer. The raid was planned so the bombs hit the ground next to the concrete to destroy the guns from underneath. Although considered successful at the time, later evaluations confirmed that the raids were largely ineffectual.[2]
Cheshire was, in his day, both the youngest Group Captain in the service and, following his VC, the most decorated
On his 103rd mission, he was the official British observer of the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki.[4] His vantage point was in the support B-29 Big Stink. He did not witness the event as close up as anticipated due to aircraft commander James Hopkins' failure to link up with the other B-29s. Hopkins was meant to join with the others over Yakushima, but he circled at 39,000 ft instead of the agreed height of 30,000 ft. He tried to justify this by the need to keep the VIP passengers out of danger, but Cheshire thought that Hopkins was "overwrought".
"Many assumed that it was Nagasaki which emptied him. In fact, as he kept pointing out, it was the war as a whole. Like Britain herself, he had been fighting or training for fighting since 1939."[5] He was earlier quoted as saying: "...then I for one hold little brief for the future of civilization".[6]
He left the RAF in 1946 and the time immediately after the war saw him start several new ventures. One of these was a community called VIP (standing for the Latin phrase Vade in Pacem, meaning Go in Peace) which eventually settled in a house called Le Court in Hampshire which Cheshire bought from an aunt. VIP's aim was to provide an opportunity for ex-servicemen and women and their families to live together, each contributing to the community what they could, in order to help their transition back into civilian life. He hoped that training, prosperity and fulfillment would result from united effort and mutual support. He saw the community as one way of continuing to work towards world peace. But the idea did not prosper and the community came to an end in 1947.[7]
At the beginning of 1948, he heard about the case of Arthur Dykes, who had been one of Cheshire's original "VIP" community at Le Court, Hampshire and was suffering from cancer. Dykes asked Cheshire to give him some land to park a caravan until he recovered, but Cheshire discovered that Dykes was terminally ill and that he had concealed this fact from him. He told Dykes the real position and invited him to stay at Le Court. Cheshire learned nursing skills and was soon approached to take in a second patient, the 94-year-old bedridden wife of a man who had just been taken off to hospital after suffering a stroke. She was followed by others, some coming to stay and others to help. Although Le Court had no financial support, and was financially perilous most of the time, money somehow always seemed to arrive in the nick of time to stave off disaster.
Cheshire had been brought up a Christian, but had lapsed. In 1945, in the Vanity Fair club in Mayfair, he joined a conversation about religion. "It was absurd," he said, "to imagine that God existed, except as a convenient figure of speech. Man had invented God to explain the voice of conscience, but it was doubtful whether right or wrong existed outside the human mind. They were words affixed like labels to customs and laws which man had also invented to keep social order." To Cheshire's surprise, as he sat back, "pleased with his worldly wisdom," he was roundly rebuked for "talking such rot" by a woman friend who "was one of the last persons on earth he would have credited with" religious convictions.[8]
Arthur Dykes died in August 1948. After completing the arrangements for his funeral, Cheshire idly picked up a book a friend had sent him. It was One Lord, One Faith by Vernon Johnson, a former High Anglican clergyman who, against every cherished instinct and prejudice, had converted to Roman Catholicism because, as he put it, "I could not resist the claim of the Catholic Church to be the one true Church founded by Our Lord Jesus Christ to guard and teach the truth.... She alone possesses the authority and unity necessary for such a Divine vocation."[9] On Christmas Eve, 1948, Cheshire was received into the Catholic Church. That day there were eight patients staying at Le Court.[10] By the end of the following June, there were twenty-eight.[11] Cheshire dedicated the rest of his life to supporting disabled people, combining this with lecturing on conflict resolution
In 1948, he founded the charity now styled Leonard Cheshire Disability, which provides support to disabled people throughout the world. It is now one of the top 30 British charities.[12]
Other organisations set up by Leonard Cheshire are:
The Ryder-Cheshire Foundation,[13] set up by Leonard Cheshire and his wife Sue Ryder at the time of their marriage in 1959. It now mainly operates in two fields: the rehabilitation of disabled people, through Ryder-Cheshire Volunteers [14] and the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis, through Target Tuberculosis.[15] In 1953 Cheshire founded the Raphael Pilgrimage in order to enable sick and disabled people to travel to Lourdes.[16]
The Leonard Cheshire Disability & Inclusive Development Centre is a joint project by Leonard Cheshire Disability and University College London (originally set up in 1997 as the Leonard Cheshire Centre of Conflict Recovery).[17]
He founded the Memorial Fund for Disaster Relief, a UK charity in whose benefit the Roger Waters concert The Wall - Live in Berlin was held. Cheshire opened this concert by blowing a Second World War whistle.
Leonard Cheshire was concerned about future remembrance and was influential in the concept of the National Memorial Arboretum, founded by David Childs. The amphitheatre at the Arboretum is dedicated to the memory of Leonard Cheshire.
On 15 July 1941, Cheshire married the American actress, Constance Binney (21 years his senior), but the marriage was short-lived and childless. On 5 April 1959, in Bombay's Roman Catholic Cathedral, he married Sue Ryder, also a Roman Catholic convert and humanitarian. He and Baroness Ryder were one of the few couples to both hold titles in their own right. They had two children, Jeromy and Elizabeth Cheshire, and lived in Cavendish, Suffolk.
He died of motor neurone disease on 31 July 1992, aged 74.
In 1981, he was awarded the Order of Merit[4] In 1991, he was given a life peerage as Baron Cheshire of Woodhall in the County of Lincolnshire,[4] sitting as a cross-bencher. Queen Elizabeth II paid personal tribute to him in her Royal Christmas Message in December 1992. In the 2002 BBC poll to find the 100 Greatest Britons, Cheshire attained position number 31. His Victoria Cross is displayed at the Imperial War Museum, London. Leonard Cheshire is acknowledged on the Roger Waters album The Wall - Live in Berlin. Former Pink Floyd member Roger Waters once described Cheshire as "the only true Christian I've ever met." There is a house at Xavier College, a leading private school in Melbourne, Australia, named after Cheshire. St Ignatius College, a private school in Sydney, Australia, also has a house named after Cheshire
ISLE NEWS Tuesday 29 March 2011 New charity foundation committee member is swinging into action with newly secured golf day sponsor
Jersey Cheshire Home has scored an ‘Eagle’ with two ‘slices’ of great news – the foundation committee has appointed a new member and the charity has also secured a two year sponsorship agreement with Hawksford International for its annual golf day.
Peter Shirreffs, former Regional Director of RBSI and NatWest, has joined the charity’s foundation committee, becoming its twelfth member. Mr Shirreffs, who worked in the sector for more than 36 years, brings with him a wealth of financial and commercial experience which will be invaluable to the charity. Mr Shirreffs is no stranger to unusual challenges having been seconded by RBS in 1983 to the Highlands and Islands Development Board in Inverness where he helped to launch Highland Spring Water. He was also involved in establishing the Prince’s Trust Volunteers Scheme in the UK.
The foundation committee has not only secured a new member, it has also signed a two-year golf day sponsorship agreement with local Trust company, Hawksford International, which is worth in excess of £13,000 over the two years to Jersey Cheshire Home.
‘I am delighted that we have secured a sponsor for our golf event for 2011 and 2012,’ said David Lord, Operations Director, Jersey Cheshire Home. ‘Each golf day raises around £12,000 for our charity and could not go ahead if a sponsor were not secured to cover the costs of the event. Hawksford International has also kindly pledged to pay for our lead raffle prize which also raises a significant amount of money for us.’
‘The Jersey Cheshire Home golf day takes place every May at La Moye Golf Club. There are at least 22 team places available, although these tend to be snapped up very quickly. Should anyone be interested in entering a team they should contact me on 285858 or at david@jerseycheshire.je,’ concluded Mr Lord.
‘We are thrilled to be sponsor of this golf event for the next two years,’ said Peter Murley, Chief Executive, Hawksford International. ‘For us, putting something back into the community here in Jersey is incredibly important, not just for the directors but for our whole team. Our staff are proud to be employees of Hawksford International because of this ethos. It costs over £1.5million per year to run Jersey Cheshire Home and we’re pleased to be able to help contribute towards this as well as ensuring that an enjoyable event is secure for the next two years.’
The Jersey Cheshire Home is established to offer long term care for individuals whose disability precludes them from living in their own home; additionally a respite facility is also provided at Eric Young House. Those needing or wishing to use the home can do so from their 16th birthday and admission must be before the 65th birthday. Once resident, the individual need not move from the home because of age. The Jersey Cheshire Home also offers day care, hydrotherapy and individually tailored long term physiotherapy treatment. The aims and objectives are to allow disabled individuals privacy, support, dignity and development of their own potential.
Looks like someone (I wonder who?) has flagged the video, it's been taken down.
Never mind, anyone who wants to hear this great song, possibly the best "baddie" animation song ever written can find it on Disney's version of THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRA DAME, HELLFIRE.
17 comments:
[1990 JLR 110]
JERSEY CHESHIRE HOME FOUNDATION V. ROTHWELL and OTHERS (practising as ROTHWELL AND PARTNERS), RICHARDS and PETER CAMERON LIMITED
ROYAL COURT (Le Marquand, Judicial Greffier): June 4th, 1990
Civil Procedure—pleading—extension of time—third party may have leave to file answer out of time if judgment not obtained against him by convening defendant—no judgment arising by implication under Royal Court Rules, 1982, r.6/10(4)(a)
A third party applied for an extension of the 28-day time limit in which to file an answer.
In January 1990 the court made an order which, inter alia, joined the first, second and third defendants to an action as third parties and stipulated that they should have 28 days in which to file an answer. One of the third parties, having filed his answer out of time, brought the present proceedings seeking an extension of time.
He submitted that since (a) the second defendant, by whom he was convened, had not applied for a default judgment against him; and (b) no judgment could be obtained in Jersey by implication and without a specific order, it followed that r.6/10(4)(a) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, did not give rise to an implied judgment against him and that no judgment existed to prevent the court from allowing the application to extend the time limit, it being open to the second defendant subsequently to apply for judgment against him on admissions under r.6/17(4).
The second defendant submitted in reply that (a) the third party had filed his answer out of time; (b) it was impossible for him to obtain judgment against the third party in such circumstances under r.6/7(5) or 6/17(4) of the Rules; and (c) in any case, a default judgment had arisen by implication against that party under r.6/10(4)(a), which was analogous to an “unless order” whereby the defendant would have a
1990 JLR 111
judgment against the third party unless an answer were filed within the time specified, and it followed that the application should be dismissed.
Held, allowing the application:
(1) Rule 6/10(4)(a) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, which specified that a third party, not having filed his answer within the given time limit, “shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the defendant’s answer and shall be bound by any judgment . . . or decision in the action . . .” did not give rise to an implied judgment in favour of the second defendant since there was no method of obtaining a judgment by implication and without a specific order made by the court and, moreover, the terms of r.6/10(4)(b) made it clear that the defendant was required to apply for judgment against the third party (page 114, lines 15–38).
(2) Since the defendant had not yet applied for a judgment against the third party, there was no judgment in existence against him and, it being common practice for the court to accept the filing of answers out of time, it followed that there was no justification for refusing the application. The defendant could, however, apply under r.6/17(4) or r.6/7(5) of the Rules, or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, for an indemnity order against the third party in relation to such sums as might be found due by the defendant to the plaintiff and in relation to his legal costs (page 115, lines 5–16; page 115, line 41 – page 116, line 3; page 116, lines 31–41).
Cases cited:
(1) Farley (Ernest) & Son Ltd. v. Takilla Ltd., 1984 J.J. 123, considered.
(2) Jones Lang Wootton v. States, Royal Ct., February 3rd, 1989, unreported.
Legislation construed:
Royal Court Rules, 1982 (R. & O. 7026), r.6/7(5):
“Where the time limited for filing an answer has expired and no answer has been filed, the plaintiff may, after giving not less than twenty-four hours’ notice to the Greffier and to the defendant, ask the Court to pronounce judgment against the defendant.”
r.6/10(3): The relevant terms of this sub-rule are set out at page 116, lines 10–13.
r.6/10(4): The relevant terms of this sub-rule are set out at page 112, lines 28–42.
r.6/10(5): “The Court may at any time set aside or vary a judgment given under paragraph (4) above on such terms as it thinks just.”
r.6/17(4): “Where admissions of fact are made by a party to an action either by his pleadings or otherwise, any other party to the action may apply to the Court for such judgment or order as on those admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, and the Court may give such judgment or make such order, on the application as it thinks just.”
1990 JLR 112
Text cited:
Supreme Court Practice 1988, vol. 1, para. 16/5/2, at 245; para. 16/5/3, at 245.
R.J. Michel for the first defendant;
J.G. White for the second defendant;
R.G.S. Fielding for the third third party.
LE MARQUAND, JUDICIAL GREFFIER: On January 23rd, 1990,
the Deputy Judicial Greffier made an order, inter alia, joining the first,
second and third defendants to this action as second, third and fourth
10 third parties. Paragraph (6) of that order read as follows—“that the
second, third and fourth third parties have twenty-eight days from the
date hereof to file an answer. . .” Peter Cameron Ltd., the third third
party, failed to file a third party answer until March 8th, 1990, which was
outside the 28-day period. The present summons has been issued in
15 order to seek an extension of the 28-day period.
The main issue before me is the question as to the effect of the failure
to file a third party answer within the time allowed. Advocate White, on
behalf of the second defendant, submitted that this failure has given his
client a judgment against the third third party for reasons set out more
20 fully below. The subsidiary issue has arisen as to how, if Advocate
White’s argument is wrong, a defendant may obtain a judgment against
a third party who defaults in filing a pleading. That issue is merely a
matter which has arisen in argument in passing and my opinion on that
matter is therefore obiter dicta but nevertheless I will express an opinion
25 on that matter as it may well assist members of the legal profession in
future cases.
Rule 6/10(4) of the Royal Court Rules, 1982, as amended, states:
“Where the time limited for filing an answer by the third party
has expired and no answer has been filed—
30 (a) he shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the
defendant’s answer and shall be bound by any judgment
(including judgment by consent) or decision in the action
insofar as it is relevant to any claim, question or issue
stated in the defendant’s answer; and
35 (b) the defendant by whom the third party was convened,
may, if judgment by default is given against him in the
action, at any time after satisfaction of that judgment and,
with the leave of the Court, before satisfaction thereof,
obtain judgment against the third party in respect of any
40 contribution or indemnity claimed in his answer and, with
the leave of the Court, in respect of any other relief or
remedy claimed therein.”
The wording of r.6/10(4) is very similar to that of O.16, r.5 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court 1965. In fact, the only differences are those
45 which are consequential upon differences in our procedure.
Advocate White’s argument may be summarized as follows:
(a) that r.6/10(4)(a) states that a third party in the position of the third
third party in this action shall be deemed to admit any claim stated in the
defendant’s answer;
5 (b) that although r.6/10(4) was very similar to O.16, r.5, the Jersey
procedure was materially different from the English procedure;
(c) that in England in such circumstances a third party could apply ex
parte for a default judgment;
(d) that the intention behind r.6/10(4) in the absence of a similar ex
10 parte procedure was not to make it more difficult for such a default
judgment to be obtained and therefore must be to give the defendant a
judgment; and
(e) that the appropriate procedure was for the third party to apply
under r.6/10(5) for the judgment to be set aside.
15 In passing, Advocate White alleged that neither r.6/7(5) nor r.6/17(4)
allowed a defendant to take a judgment against a third party in such
circumstances and that therefore a judgment must be implied so that the
words “shall be deemed to admit any claims stated in the defendant’s
answer and shall be bound” were equivalent to the words “shall be
20 deemed to have a judgment given against him.” Advocate White further
stated that although he was not able to quote as a precedent any other
example of a judgment being presumed, the position was analogous to
that of an “unless order.” That is to say, that the effect of r.6/10(4) was
that of an “unless order” stating that unless the third party filed an
25 answer within the time period, the defendant would have a judgment
against him.
Advocate Fielding for the third third party argued that no judgment
had been obtained, that there was no other example in Jersey law in
which a judgment could be given by implication of law without the need
30 for an actual verdict to be pronounced by a court and that it was open to
a defendant to apply under r.6/17(4) for judgment on admissions.
Advocate Fielding took the view that it would not be appropriate for a
defendant to apply under r.6/7(5).
Advocate Michel for the first defendant agreed that there was no
35 judgment in existence and argued that under the English procedure it
was still necessary for a judgment to be pronounced. He took the view
that a defendant could apply either under r.6/17(4) or under r.6/7(5).
Advocate Fielding referred to 1 The Supreme Court Practice 1988,
para. 16/5/2, at 245, and I now quote that paragraph in full:
40 “Effect of default by third party—Where the third party is in
default of giving notice of intention to defend or, when ordered to
serve a defence, in default of defence, he is deemed to admit the
claim stated in the third party notice and is bound by any judgment
or decision in the action in so far as it is relevant to any claim,
45 question or issue stated in the notice. Whether the effect of such
1990 JLR 114
admission and of being so bound entitles the defendant to apply for
judgment, O.27, r.3 has not been decided; but, especially when the
third party is in default of defence, there seems no reason why that
rule should not apply to such a case.”
5 Order 27, r.3 is the English rule on judgment on admissions and
corresponds very closely to our r.6/17(4). Advocate Fielding also
referred to para. 16/5/3 and the fact that it states “there appear to be two
modes by which the defendant may enter judgment against a third party
in default.” Those two modes are in fact those which are set out in O.16,
10 r.5(1)(a) and (b) and are in circumstances which are analogous to those
set out in r.6/10(4)(a) and (b). Advocate Fielding’s argument was that in
each case a judgment had to be entered and that under O.16, r.5(1)(a)
this had to be with leave unless the defendant had already satisfied any
judgment given against him by the plaintiff.
15 I do not find any part of Advocate White’s argument attractive. It is
clear to me that even in England a judgment is not presumed but that
some procedure has to be followed in order to obtain it. It is clear, as a
matter of general principle, that it is more difficult to obtain a judgment
in Jersey than it is in England and that a judgment can only be obtained
20 in Jersey by a specific order of a court. An “unless order” is in itself a
specific order of a court. I therefore find it impossible to agree with him
that r.6/10(4)(a) gives rise to an implied judgment. Indeed, I do not
believe that any rule of court or principle of law in the Island of Jersey
gives rise to a judgment without the decision of a court. However, there
25 is a fundamental flaw in Advocate White’s argument by reason of the
terms of r.6/10(4)(b). This sub-rule deals with a particular example of
default under r.6/10(4), namely that in which the defendant allows a
default judgment to be taken against him. In those circumstances it is
clear that the defendant still has to apply under r.6/10(4)(b) in order to
30 obtain a judgment against the third party. That clearly presumes that he
does not already have a judgment against the third party but on
Advocate White’s argument he would already have such a judgment
under r.6/10(4)(a).
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I reject the second
35 defendant’s arguments and find that the second defendant has no
judgment against the third third party. Similarly, the first defendants
have no judgment against the third third party, although the first
defendants have never argued along those lines.
Counsel for both the first defendants and the second defendant having
40 accepted that if I found that there was no judgment in existence then
there remained no satisfactory arguments against extending the time
period, I have so ordered. All three counsel were aware of the fact that
it is often the practice of advocates to file pleadings outside the strict
time periods and that no objection is usually raised to them. An obvious
45 example of this would be the filing of an answer. Answers are often filed
1990 JLR 115
out of time and the court will normally only grant a judgment under
r.6/7(5) when the default has continued up to the time on the Friday
afternoon at which the application under that rule is heard. It has not
been the practice of the Judicial Greffe to refuse to accept pleadings
5 which are filed out of time. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in the case of
Ernest Farley & Son Ltd. v. Takilla Ltd. (1), which related to the appeal
procedure in the Court of Appeal, indicated that the Judicial Greffe
should not reject a document for some procedural irregularity but that
the document should be filed and then subsequently attacked by the
10 other party. The same principle would appear to apply to Royal Court
pleadings, although it is unusual for another party to oppose a document
which has been filed out of time. Other parties have effective remedies
to force the filing of an answer or a third party answer or further and
better particulars of an existing pleading and the court has effective
15 powers under r.6/21(2) to give directions in relation to the filing of
further pleadings on an application for setting down on the hearing list.
I turn finally to the question as to whether a defendant can obtain a
judgment against a third party prior to judgment being given against the
defendant in the main action. It is clear that the procedures referred to
20 in sub-paras. (a) and (b) of r.6/10(4) only come into effect upon
judgment being given in the main action. 1 The Supreme Court Practice
1988, para. 16/5/3, at 245 explains the way in which a defendant obtains
a judgment against a third party after judgment in the main action. In
my view, in Jersey it will be necessary for a defendant to apply for such a
25 judgment and this could most conveniently be done at the hearing of the
trial under sub-para. (a) or on the giving of the default judgment under
sub-para. (b).
However, there remains a very real practical problem from the point
of view of a defendant. If the defendant has to wait until the actual trial
30 of the action or until some interim judgment is given against him and if
the third party is in a position to be able to file a third party answer at
any time subject to its being opposed as mentioned above, then the
defendant has difficulty in knowing whether or not he can safely assume
that the third party is admitting liability to the defendant as set out in the
35 third party claim. There should, therefore, be some method by which
the defendant can obtain a judgment from the court against the third
party to the effect that the third party is bound to indemnify the
defendant in relation to such sums as may be found due by the
defendant to the plaintiff and in relation to the costs of the action
40 incurred by the defendant.
Advocate White argued that r.6/17(4) was not applicable because the
deemed admissions under r.6/10(4)(a) were not admissions of fact. I do
not agree with this argument as I cannot see that the deemed admissions
of any claim stated in the defendant’s answer can be anything other than
45 admissions of fact as well as admissions of law. Accordingly, I agree
1990 JLR 116
with the commentator in para. 16/5/2 quoted above that there seems no
reason why O.27, r.3 in England and r.6/17(4) in Jersey should not
apply to such a case.
I come finally to the question as to whether r.6/7(5) also applies.
5 Advocate Michel argued that it applied and that the defendant therefore
had two ways of proceeding. He said that an application under r.6/17(4)
would be preferable, as a judgment on admissions was a better
judgment than a judgment in default of an answer. The matter turns
upon the interpretation of r.6/10(3) which states:
10 “Where a third party has been so convened, he shall from the
time of service be a party to the action as if he had been made a
defendant in an original action either by the defendant on whose
application he was convened or by the plaintiff.”
The question is whether or not this sub-rule brings the third party within
15 the terms of r.6/7(5). I am not able to obtain any assistance from The
Supreme Court Practice 1988, as neither r.6/10(3) nor r.6/7(5) have
parallels therein. It is clear that r.6/10(3) has an effect in relation to the
question of prescription periods and this was demonstrated in Jones
Lang Wootton v. States (2). However, does r.6/10(3) mean that for all
20 purposes a third party shall be treated as if he were a defendant? This is
an important point as a number of rules, including r.6/9 relating to
counterclaims, r.6/15 in relation to interrogatories and r.6/26(1) in
relation to payment into court, refer to defendants but not to third
parties. It would appear to be logical in relation to those rules that third
25 parties ought to have the same rights and privileges as against
defendants as defendants have against plaintiffs. The question in
relation to r.6/7(5) is whether defendants ought to have the same rights
as against third parties as plaintiffs have against defendants. There is a
difficulty inasmuch as r.6/7(5) refers specifically to the plaintiff’s having
30 the right to apply, whereas r.6/17(4) refers to admissions of fact by a
party to an action in an application by any other party to the action. I am
of the opinion that a defendant must have a satisfactory means of
obtaining judgment against a third party who is in default of an answer
and that the combination of r.6/10(3) and r.6/7(5) would appear to
35 provide a second method to that provided by r.6/17(4). However, if that
view is wrong, then it appears to me that a defendant has the right to
bring to the court’s attention the failure of the third party to comply with
the rules and to seek an appropriate order to compel performance
therewith. If that is not strictly under the terms of r.6/7(5), then it
40 appears to me that such an order could be obtained by summons before
the Royal Court under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Application allowed.
Leonard CheshireFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Group Captain Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, Baron Cheshire, VC, OM, DSO and Two Bars, DFC (7 September 1917 – 31 July 1992) was a highly decorated British RAF pilot during the Second World War.
Among the honours he received as a bomber pilot is the Victoria Cross, the highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy that can be awarded to British and Commonwealth forces. After the war, he became a charity worker, setting up the Leonard Cheshire Disability as well as other philanthropic organisations.
Leonard Cheshire was the son of Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire, DCL, LLD, FBA, a barrister, academic and influential writer on English law. He had one brother, Christopher Cheshire, also a wartime pilot. Cheshire was born in Chester, but was brought up at his parents' home near Oxford. He was educated at the Dragon School, Oxford, Stowe School and Merton College, Oxford. While at Oxford he became friends with John Niel Randle. On one occasion at Oxford he was bet half a pint of beer that he could not walk to Paris. With no more than a few pennies and a pocket handkerchief he won his bet. Cheshire graduated in Jurisprudence in 1939. He went to stay in Germany in 1936 with a family in Potsdam
After the outbreak of the Second World War, Cheshire applied for a commission in the Royal Air Force and was initially posted in June 1940 to 102 Squadron, flying Armstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bombers, from RAF Driffield. In November 1940, he was awarded the DSO for flying his badly-damaged bomber back to base.
In January 1941, he completed his tour of operations, but then volunteered straight away for a second tour. He was posted to 35 Squadron with the brand new Handley Page Halifax, and completed his second tour early in 1942, by now a Squadron Leader. August 1942 saw a return to operations as CO of No. 76 Squadron RAF. The squadron had recently suffered high losses operating the Halifax, and Cheshire immediately tackled the low morale of the unit by ordering an improvement in the performance of the squadron aircraft by removing the mid-upper and nose gun turrets along with exhaust covers and other weighty non-essential equipment. This allowed the bombers to fly higher and faster. Losses soon fell and morale rose accordingly.
In 1943 Cheshire published an account of his first tour of operations in his book "Bomber Pilot" which tells of his posting to RAF Driffield and tells the story of flying his badly-damaged bomber ("N for Nuts") back to base. In the book he fails to mention being awarded the DSO for this, but does describe the bravery of a badly burnt member of his crew.
Cheshire became Station Officer Commanding RAF Marston Moor in March as the youngest Group Captain in the RAF, though the job was never to his liking and he pushed for a return to an operational command. These efforts paid off with a posting as commander of the legendary 617 "Dambusters" Squadron in September 1943.
While with 617, Cheshire helped pioneer a new method of marking enemy targets for Bomber Command's 5 Group, flying in at a very low level in the face of strong defences, using first, the versatile Mosquito, then a "borrowed" P-51 Mustang fighter. This development work was the subject of some severe intraservice politics; Cheshire was encouraged by his 5 Group Commander Air Vice-Marshal Ralph Cochrane, although the 8 Group Pathfinder AOC Air Vice-Marshal Don Bennett saw this work as impinging on the responsibilities of his own command.
Cheshire was nearing the end of his fourth tour of duty in July 1944, having completed a total of 102 missions, when he was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was the only one of the 32 VC airmen to win the medal for an extended period of sustained courage and outstanding effort, rather than a single act of valour. His citation noted:
In four years of fighting against the bitterest opposition he maintained a standard of outstanding personal achievement, his successful operations being the result of careful planning, brilliant execution and supreme contempt for danger – for example, on one occasion he flew his P-51 Mustang in slow 'figures of eight' above a target obscured by low cloud, to act as a bomb-aiming mark for his squadron. Cheshire displayed the courage and determination of an exceptional leader.[1]
It also noted a raid in which he had marked a target, flying a Mosquito at low level against "withering fire".
One of Cheshire's missions was to use new 5,400 kilograms (12,000 lb) "Tallboy" deep-penetration bombs to destroy V3 long-range cannons located in underground bunkers near Mimoyecques in the Pas-de-Calais region of northern France. These were powerful guns able to fire a 500 lb shell into London every minute. They were protected by a concrete layer. The raid was planned so the bombs hit the ground next to the concrete to destroy the guns from underneath. Although considered successful at the time, later evaluations confirmed that the raids were largely ineffectual.[2]
Cheshire was, in his day, both the youngest Group Captain in the service and, following his VC, the most decorated
On his 103rd mission, he was the official British observer of the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki.[4] His vantage point was in the support B-29 Big Stink. He did not witness the event as close up as anticipated due to aircraft commander James Hopkins' failure to link up with the other B-29s. Hopkins was meant to join with the others over Yakushima, but he circled at 39,000 ft instead of the agreed height of 30,000 ft. He tried to justify this by the need to keep the VIP passengers out of danger, but Cheshire thought that Hopkins was "overwrought".
"Many assumed that it was Nagasaki which emptied him. In fact, as he kept pointing out, it was the war as a whole. Like Britain herself, he had been fighting or training for fighting since 1939."[5] He was earlier quoted as saying: "...then I for one hold little brief for the future of civilization".[6]
He left the RAF in 1946 and the time immediately after the war saw him start several new ventures. One of these was a community called VIP (standing for the Latin phrase Vade in Pacem, meaning Go in Peace) which eventually settled in a house called Le Court in Hampshire which Cheshire bought from an aunt. VIP's aim was to provide an opportunity for ex-servicemen and women and their families to live together, each contributing to the community what they could, in order to help their transition back into civilian life. He hoped that training, prosperity and fulfillment would result from united effort and mutual support. He saw the community as one way of continuing to work towards world peace. But the idea did not prosper and the community came to an end in 1947.[7]
At the beginning of 1948, he heard about the case of Arthur Dykes, who had been one of Cheshire's original "VIP" community at Le Court, Hampshire and was suffering from cancer. Dykes asked Cheshire to give him some land to park a caravan until he recovered, but Cheshire discovered that Dykes was terminally ill and that he had concealed this fact from him. He told Dykes the real position and invited him to stay at Le Court. Cheshire learned nursing skills and was soon approached to take in a second patient, the 94-year-old bedridden wife of a man who had just been taken off to hospital after suffering a stroke. She was followed by others, some coming to stay and others to help. Although Le Court had no financial support, and was financially perilous most of the time, money somehow always seemed to arrive in the nick of time to stave off disaster.
Cheshire had been brought up a Christian, but had lapsed. In 1945, in the Vanity Fair club in Mayfair, he joined a conversation about religion. "It was absurd," he said, "to imagine that God existed, except as a convenient figure of speech. Man had invented God to explain the voice of conscience, but it was doubtful whether right or wrong existed outside the human mind. They were words affixed like labels to customs and laws which man had also invented to keep social order." To Cheshire's surprise, as he sat back, "pleased with his worldly wisdom," he was roundly rebuked for "talking such rot" by a woman friend who "was one of the last persons on earth he would have credited with" religious convictions.[8]
Arthur Dykes died in August 1948. After completing the arrangements for his funeral, Cheshire idly picked up a book a friend had sent him. It was One Lord, One Faith by Vernon Johnson, a former High Anglican clergyman who, against every cherished instinct and prejudice, had converted to Roman Catholicism because, as he put it, "I could not resist the claim of the Catholic Church to be the one true Church founded by Our Lord Jesus Christ to guard and teach the truth.... She alone possesses the authority and unity necessary for such a Divine vocation."[9] On Christmas Eve, 1948, Cheshire was received into the Catholic Church. That day there were eight patients staying at Le Court.[10] By the end of the following June, there were twenty-eight.[11] Cheshire dedicated the rest of his life to supporting disabled people, combining this with lecturing on conflict resolution
In 1948, he founded the charity now styled Leonard Cheshire Disability, which provides support to disabled people throughout the world. It is now one of the top 30 British charities.[12]
Other organisations set up by Leonard Cheshire are:
The Ryder-Cheshire Foundation,[13] set up by Leonard Cheshire and his wife Sue Ryder at the time of their marriage in 1959. It now mainly operates in two fields: the rehabilitation of disabled people, through Ryder-Cheshire Volunteers [14] and the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis, through Target Tuberculosis.[15]
In 1953 Cheshire founded the Raphael Pilgrimage in order to enable sick and disabled people to travel to Lourdes.[16]
The Leonard Cheshire Disability & Inclusive Development Centre is a joint project by Leonard Cheshire Disability and University College London (originally set up in 1997 as the Leonard Cheshire Centre of Conflict Recovery).[17]
He founded the Memorial Fund for Disaster Relief, a UK charity in whose benefit the Roger Waters concert The Wall - Live in Berlin was held. Cheshire opened this concert by blowing a Second World War whistle.
Leonard Cheshire was concerned about future remembrance and was influential in the concept of the National Memorial Arboretum, founded by David Childs. The amphitheatre at the Arboretum is dedicated to the memory of Leonard Cheshire.
On 15 July 1941, Cheshire married the American actress, Constance Binney (21 years his senior), but the marriage was short-lived and childless. On 5 April 1959, in Bombay's Roman Catholic Cathedral, he married Sue Ryder, also a Roman Catholic convert and humanitarian. He and Baroness Ryder were one of the few couples to both hold titles in their own right. They had two children, Jeromy and Elizabeth Cheshire, and lived in Cavendish, Suffolk.
He died of motor neurone disease on 31 July 1992, aged 74.
In 1981, he was awarded the Order of Merit[4]
In 1991, he was given a life peerage as Baron Cheshire of Woodhall in the County of Lincolnshire,[4] sitting as a cross-bencher.
Queen Elizabeth II paid personal tribute to him in her Royal Christmas Message in December 1992. In the 2002 BBC poll to find the 100 Greatest Britons, Cheshire attained position number 31. His Victoria Cross is displayed at the Imperial War Museum, London.
Leonard Cheshire is acknowledged on the Roger Waters album The Wall - Live in Berlin. Former Pink Floyd member Roger Waters once described Cheshire as "the only true Christian I've ever met."
There is a house at Xavier College, a leading private school in Melbourne, Australia, named after Cheshire. St Ignatius College, a private school in Sydney, Australia, also has a house named after Cheshire
ISLE NEWS Tuesday 29 March 2011
New charity foundation committee member is swinging into action with newly secured golf day sponsor
Jersey Cheshire Home has scored an ‘Eagle’ with two ‘slices’ of great news – the foundation committee has appointed a new member and the charity has also secured a two year sponsorship agreement with Hawksford International for its annual golf day.
Peter Shirreffs, former Regional Director of RBSI and NatWest, has joined the charity’s foundation committee, becoming its twelfth member. Mr Shirreffs, who worked in the sector for more than 36 years, brings with him a wealth of financial and commercial experience which will be invaluable to the charity. Mr Shirreffs is no stranger to unusual challenges having been seconded by RBS in 1983 to the Highlands and Islands Development Board in Inverness where he helped to launch Highland Spring Water. He was also involved in establishing the Prince’s Trust Volunteers Scheme in the UK.
The foundation committee has not only secured a new member, it has also signed a two-year golf day sponsorship agreement with local Trust company, Hawksford International, which is worth in excess of £13,000 over the two years to Jersey Cheshire Home.
‘I am delighted that we have secured a sponsor for our golf event for 2011 and 2012,’ said David Lord, Operations Director, Jersey Cheshire Home. ‘Each golf day raises around £12,000 for our charity and could not go ahead if a sponsor were not secured to cover the costs of the event. Hawksford International has also kindly pledged to pay for our lead raffle prize which also raises a significant amount of money for us.’
‘The Jersey Cheshire Home golf day takes place every May at La Moye Golf Club. There are at least 22 team places available, although these tend to be snapped up very quickly. Should anyone be interested in entering a team they should contact me on 285858 or at david@jerseycheshire.je,’ concluded Mr Lord.
‘We are thrilled to be sponsor of this golf event for the next two years,’ said Peter Murley, Chief Executive, Hawksford International. ‘For us, putting something back into the community here in Jersey is incredibly important, not just for the directors but for our whole team. Our staff are proud to be employees of Hawksford International because of this ethos. It costs over £1.5million per year to run Jersey Cheshire Home and we’re pleased to be able to help contribute towards this as well as ensuring that an enjoyable event is secure for the next two years.’
The Jersey Cheshire Home is established to offer long term care for individuals whose disability precludes them from living in their own home; additionally a respite facility is also provided at Eric Young House. Those needing or wishing to use the home can do so from their 16th birthday and admission must be before the 65th birthday. Once resident, the individual need not move from the home because of age. The Jersey Cheshire Home also offers day care, hydrotherapy and individually tailored long term physiotherapy treatment. The aims and objectives are to allow disabled individuals privacy, support, dignity and development of their own potential.
Looks like someone (I wonder who?) has flagged the video, it's been taken down.
Never mind, anyone who wants to hear this great song, possibly the best "baddie" animation song ever written can find it on Disney's version of THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRA DAME, HELLFIRE.
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